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The Geography of Conflicts  
and Regional Trade Agreements†
By Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer, and Mathias Thoenig*
In addition to standard trade gains, regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
can promote peaceful relations by increasing the opportunity cost of 
conflicts. Country pairs with large trade gains from RTAs and a high 
probability of conflict should be more likely to sign an RTA. Using 
data from 1950 to 2000, we show that this complementarity between 
economic and politics determines the geography of RTAs. We disen-
tangle trade gains from political factors by a theory-driven empirical 
estimation and find that country pairs with higher frequency of past 
wars are more likely to sign RTAs, the more so the larger the trade 
gains. (JEL D72, D74, F15, N70)
“… people forget too often about the political objectives of the European 
constitution. The argument in favor of the single currency should be based 
on the desire to live together in peace,”
— Jacques Delors (former president of the European Commission 1997).
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have a bad reputation among a number of economists. Many scholars argue that they constitute a threat to the carefully 
constructed post-war multilateral trade system. Whereas multilateral trade liberal-
ization has stalled, the number of RTAs has massively expanded during the last 
two decades, and they are now well over 300. The well-known problem with these 
bilateral and regional agreements is that, although they create trade, they also gen-
erate distortions by excluding countries.1 Much less attention has been paid (by 
economists) to the political and strategic motivations for regional integration, even 
1 The most recent evidence (Baier and Bergstrand 2007, using gravity equations) on trade creation finds a rela-
tively large effect: RTAs are on average responsible for a doubling of trade between two members after ten years. 
Baier and Bergstrand (2009) use matching techniques and confirm this large effect of RTAs on trade between mem-
bers. Much less is known about trade diversion and, therefore, the potential economic costs of these preferential 
agreements. Hence, the economic case for RTAs is still an open debate.
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though these motivations may have been key historically.2 In the case of Europe, 
political scientists and historians have insisted on the fact that economic integration 
was viewed as an intermediate objective while its final objective was to prevent the 
killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again. Even the 
recent creation of the euro, often interpreted by economists as a logical step toward 
more economic integration, has been discussed in these terms (see quote above). 
Before that, the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty was signed to diffuse tensions between 
the two countries. Outside Europe, Mercosur was created in 1991 in part to curtail 
the military power in Argentina and Brazil, then two recent and fragile democracies 
with potential conflicts over natural resources. In fact, the debate between econo-
mists and political scientists often interprets economic and political rationales for 
RTAs as substitutes. In this paper, we revisit the case for regional integration by 
explicitly linking the economic and political rationales, and we show empirically 
that the two complement each other.
An important link between trade policy and conflicts is the so called Liberal Peace 
argument, which states that bilateral trade flows reduce the probability of a bilateral war, 
a channel that has been analyzed theoretically and on which some empirical evidence 
exists.3 A closely related mechanism is that RTAs, because they create trade, reduce the 
probability of wars between countries. Combining the estimate of the trade-creating 
effect of RTAs by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and the estimate of the trade-induced 
reduction of war probability by Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008a), we can get a 
rough estimate of this mechanism. In their preferred regression, Martin, Mayer, and 
Thoenig (2008a) estimate an elasticity of −0.236 for the impact of bilateral trade open-
ness on war probability for contiguous countries. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that 
an RTA has a large trade creation effect by doubling bilateral trade after ten years. As 
long as the probability of war between contiguous countries is low (it is estimated at 
4 percent in Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008a) this suggests that an RTA, by doubling 
bilateral trade, would roughly decrease the probability of conflict by 23 percent for a 
pair of contiguous countries. However, such a back-of-the-envelope estimate should 
be interpreted with extreme caution. The combination of these estimates above may 
be biased because of a severe reverse causality issue: two countries may sign an RTA 
partly because they expect that their conflictuality is going to fade in the near future. 
In this case, a lower expected probability of conflict causes the signing of RTAs. The 
lack of historical perspective following RTA formation (most RTAs were signed in the 
1990s and 2000s) would also make identification difficult in the panel dimension.4 In 
this paper, we choose a different route by asking a different question: is the geography 
of RTAs consistent with a model in which policy makers believe that RTAs are pacify-
ing and therefore believe in the Liberal Peace argument? This empirical strategy allows 
us to exploit the period preceding RTAs formation for identifying the relevant effects.
2 Cordell Hull, President F. D. Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, was a fervent promoter of free trade with the belief 
that trade leads to peace.
3 See for instance Polachek (1980); Oneal and Russett (1999); Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008a); Spolaore 
and Wacziarg (2009); Hegre, Oneal, and Russett (2010). See also Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008b) for a related 
argument for civil wars.
4 Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) find that country pairs in RTAs are less likely to be in conflict than others. 
However, their cross-sectional evidence does not allow us to conclude on the direction of causality.
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We first use a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the different mechanisms 
at work in the decision whether to sign an RTA or not. In addition to the expected 
trade gains, policymakers consider that RTAs provide two types of peace-promoting 
security gains: by offering a political forum which facilitates settlement of future 
disputes, and by increasing the opportunity cost of future and potentially trade-
disrupting wars. This simple framework allows us to derive several testable impli-
cations. First, RTAs are more beneficial to country pairs with a higher probability 
of war because the expected welfare gain of the political forum channel is larger. 
Second, expected trade gains and the probability of war have a positive and comple-
mentary impact on RTA formation. The complementarity stems from the opportu-
nity cost channel: the larger the trade gains, the larger the opportunity cost of a war, 
and therefore the more useful an RTA is to secure peace, which is more valuable to 
countries that have a higher probability of war.
Our empirical analysis estimates a model of RTA formation at the country pair level 
over the 1950 –2000 period to analyze whether the evolving geography of RTAs is 
consistent with the economic and political factors identified in the theoretical section. 
From the perspective of the identification strategy, an important concern is that many 
empirical determinants of wars and of the RTA-related trade gains are confounded: the 
gravity covariates, such as geographical distance, economic size, contiguity, cultural 
distance, etc., do affect the propensity to fight and the propensity to trade. This issue 
explains why the existing empirical literature on RTA formation has difficulty in dis-
entangling the economic factors from the political factors. Here, we propose to rely 
on a theory-driven estimation procedure to quantify directly the potential trade gains 
generated by RTAs. To our knowledge we are the first to adopt such a strategy and this 
is an additional contribution of our paper. We address the various endogeneity issues 
by controlling for the main codeterminants of political affinity, conflicts and trade; by 
including various country, country pair, and year-fixed effects; and by instrumenting 
trade gains. All the results are robust to these different estimation strategies. In par-
ticular, we check that the results are not driven by the European integration process 
although the mechanism is stronger for European country pairs.
Both in the cross-section and in the panel dimension, we find that trade gains and 
frequency of old wars have a high explanatory power and both increase the occur-
rence of RTA formation; their interaction term also has a positive impact, and this 
confirms complementarity between economic and political factors. By contrast, recent 
war frequency decreases the occurrence of RTA formation, suggesting the presence 
of windows of opportunity to lock-in RTAs. Periods of interrupted conflict between 
old enemies may help them to form an RTA in order to settle a more peaceful bilateral 
relation. Finally, we find that country pairs characterized by multilateral trade openness 
and a high frequency of old wars are more likely to sign RTAs. We interpret this in the 
light of one of our main findings in Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008a): Multilateral 
trade openness, because it reduces bilateral economic dependence and the opportunity 
cost of a bilateral war, increases the probability that a dispute escalates into a conflict. 
In other words, countries respond to the weakening of local economic ties (a side effect 
of multilateral trade liberalization), and its potentially peace-harming consequences, by 
reinforcing local economic ties through an RTA. From this point of view, we interpret 
the multiplication of RTAs as a logical political response to trade multilateralism.
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In the last section of the paper, we perform a quantitative interpretation of the 
econometric results. We find that the complementarity between trade gains and the 
probability of war is sizeable and may even dominate the direct effect of each of 
these variables. This suggests that trade gains brought by RTAs are instrumental-
ized and are important as an intermediate objective of RTAs, their final goal being 
to pacify relations between countries. We also find that in a counterfactual world 
without any past history of warfare, the geography of RTAs formation would be 
radically different from the one actually observed. The same is true for a counter-
factual world with no multilateral trade openness.
The theoretical economic literature on RTA formation is very large. Nevertheless 
existing papers focus their analysis on the economic determinants,5 the role of secu-
rity gains and military conflicts being largely ignored. From an empirical point of 
view, several papers study the economic determinants of RTAs (Baier and Bergstrand 
2004; Egger and Larch 2008) under the identifying assumption that RTA-related 
trade gains are closely linked to the standard gravity covariates. As discussed above, 
this does not allow us to discriminate between the economic and political factors, 
which is the purpose of our study. Symmetrically, Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) 
and Vicard (2012) look at the impact of RTA formation on the occurrence of military 
conflicts, ignoring the potential role of economic factors.
The next section provides a simple framework and derives several testable impli-
cations. Section II presents the data, and discusses the empirical strategy. Section III 
reports our main empirical results and performs some quantification exercises, while 
Section IV concludes.
I. A Simple Framework
We now present a cost/benefit analysis of RTA formation. We keep the analysis 
as simple as possible, our purpose being to derive the minimal setup for grounding 
our econometric specification (see equation (8)). We leave for future work the build-
ing of a fully-fledged theory of the dynamics of RTA formation in presence of trade-
disrupting conflicts. Such a theory goes beyond the scope of this paper. Readers who 
wish to skip this step may go directly to Subsection IC.
A. Timing and Welfare
We consider an insecure multi-country world where two countries decide whether 
to sign a bilateral RTA, which we interpret as a decrease in bilateral trade barriers 
with respect to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff. We analyze hereafter how 
this decision is shaped by economic and political forces. For the ease of exposition, 
we focus, in this section only, on two identical countries.
Two main features describe bilateral relations between countries. First, whether 
they have signed an RTA or not. The variables of those who have signed an RTA are 
5 This literature has analyzed the motives for building RTAs mainly from a term-of-trade perspective (Bagwell 
and Staiger 1997; Ornelas 2005) and from a commitment perspective (Limao 2007; Maggi and Rodríguez- 
Clare 1998).
VoL. 4 no. 4 5MARTIn ET AL .: ConfLICTS AnD REGIonAL TRADE AGREEMEnTS
denoted with a superscript RTA. Those who have not signed have no superscript. 
The second dimension is whether the two countries are at war or in peace.
The timing of events is as follows: in period 1, countries negotiate on the RTA. 
We make no particular assumption on the bargaining process but assume that there 
is a political cost of negotiation C that is borne by each country. In period 2, we 
assume that a bilateral dispute may arise with probability δ for exogenous reasons 
(the existence of a common border, natural resources, ethnic minorities, …) and 
may escalate into a military conflict with an endogenous conditional probability: 
e in absence of an RTA or  e RTA if an RTA is in force. In period 3, trade gains are 
realized and each country gets an aggregate welfare level, which depends on the 
existence of an RTA and on the realization of a war at date 2.
In the rest of our analysis, we express all welfare gains or losses as a percentage 
of a benchmark welfare, UP , which is realized in the state of peace in absence of an 
RTA. In this state, both countries trade bilaterally and the MFN tariff level is applied. 
When war occurs, we assume that bilateral trade is fully disrupted and both countries 
go back to bilateral economic autarky. This trade disrupting effect of war is empirically 
well grounded (Blomberg and Hess 2006; Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008a; Glick 
and Taylor 2010). Hence, welfare under war is given by (1 − W )UP with 0 < W< 1, 
whether an RTA is in force or not. The parameter W captures the direct costs of war 
(i.e., destructions, death toll, etc.) augmented with the loss associated to bilateral eco-
nomic autarky (with respect to the MFN situation). When an RTA is in force, additional 
welfare gains with respect to the MFN situation are generated only if peace is main-
tained; in that case welfare is given by (1 + T )UP . One of the purposes of the empirical 
analysis is to estimate precisely these trade gains T associated to RTA formation.
The opportunity cost of war corresponds to the welfare differential between war 
and peace. From the previous discussion we see that in absence of an RTA, this dif-
ferential is equal to W U P , while it is equal to (W + T ) U P when an RTA is in force. As a 
consequence, signing an RTA increases the opportunity cost of a war by T/W percent.
B. Signing an RTA: Testable Implications
At date 1, an RTA is signed when, for each country, the expected utility gains 
induced by the RTA, Γ, are larger than the political cost. Noting  V RTA and V the 
expected welfare with and without RTA, the condition for RTA signature is:
(1)  Γ ≡  V RTA − V ≥ C,
where V = (1 − δe) U P + δe(1 − W ) U P and  V RTA = (1 − δ e RTA )(1 + T ) U P + δ e RTA (1 − W)  U P . Without loss of generality, we can express the political cost as a 
percentage of the benchmark welfare: C = c ×  U P . Below, we detail some likely 
determinants of the negotiation cost c. Combining those equations with equation 
(1), the condition for signing an RTA becomes:
(2)  Γ ≡ ( 1 − δ  e RTA ) T + δ(e−  e RTA )W ≥ c, 3 3
 economic gains security gains
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where, on the left-hand side, we have decomposed the net expected surplus of RTA 
formation into pure economic gains and security gains. Economic gains result from 
the increase in welfare from  U P to (1 + T ) U P when the RTA is active. However, 
the RTA related trade gains T are realized only in periods of peace, which occur with 
probability (1 − δ  e RTA ). The security gain of an RTA is associated with the potential 
decrease in the probability of escalation of disputes into war from e to  e RTA . This 
allows us to save on the costs of war W.
We now analyze the differential (e −  e RTA ). As shown by the international 
relations literature (see Fearon 1995 and Powell 1999 for surveys), escalation to 
military conflicts can be interpreted as the failure of negotiations in a bargaining 
game. From this perspective, the probability of escalation depends negatively on 
the opportunity cost of war and positively on the degree of informational asym-
metry between the two countries.6 The rationale for the first channel is that, as 
the opportunity cost of war increases, countries have more incentive to make con-
cessions in order to avoid the escalation of a dispute into a military conflict. The 
rationale for the second channel is that information asymmetries imply that during 
negotiations, countries do not report their true outside option, in order to extract 
larger concessions. This may prevent negotiations to succeed and disputes may 
escalate into war.
The signature of an RTA affects the probability of escalation, e, through these 
two distinct channels. First, as discussed in the previous section, RTA potentially 
increases the opportunity cost of war by T/W percent and thus reduces the prob-
ability of escalation. Second, regional integration produces a political spillover on 
conflict resolution by reducing the degree of informational asymmetries. Successful 
negotiations on economic and trade matters, and the repeated interactions that fol-
low these negotiations, enable policymakers to learn about the other country. This 
channel has been discussed at length in the political science literature,7 and many 
RTAs, such as the European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), or Mercosur, have become venues to discuss political issues and poten-
tial disputes. Transposed to our framework, this discussion implies the following 
assumption on the probability of escalation under an RTA:
(3)    e RTA − e _e  = − ε pol −  ε cost ×  T _ W < 0,
where  ε pol > 0 stands for the political spillover effect, while  ε cost > 0 corresponds 
to the elasticity of escalation e to the cost of war. In the rest of the paper, we refer 
to ( ε pol ,  ε cost ) as the security gains of RTA formation. This also points to a limita-
tion of our framework: we do not model jointly the decision to sign an RTA and the 
6 For a formal proof, see for example Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008a), where we consider a fairly general 
bargaining game, such that: war is Pareto dominated by peace, countries have private information on the military 
and political strength of the other country, and countries can choose any type of negotiation protocol. The negotia-
tion is such that escalation to war is avoided whenever countries agree upon the sharing of the economic surplus 
under peace.
7 This argument, under the name of issue linkage, has been developed by political scientists working in the field 
of international relations, see Keohan and Nye (1977), Haas (1980), and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000).
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escalation to war. In Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008a), we present a model of 
escalation based on asymmetric information. We leave for further research an analy-
sis where both RTA formation and escalation to war are made endogenous.
Under the reasonable assumption8 that the RTA-related trade gain T is small with 
respect to the cost of war W, we can combine (2) and (3) to get an approximation of 
the RTA signature condition (see the Appendix for the details):
(4)  Γ = T +  ε pol (δe × W) + ( ε cost − 1)(δe × T ) ≥ c,
where Γ corresponds to the utility gains of RTA formation. This equation is our key 
prediction and will serve as a foundation for the econometric estimation. It contains 
five main predictions on the determinants of signing RTAs:
•	 The	 first	 term	 (T ) on the left-hand side of this inequality corresponds to 
the standard trade gains generated by the RTA on which the literature has 
focused. Larger trade gains are predicted to increase the probability that the 
two countries sign an RTA. The difficulty here is to produce a quantitative 
estimate of those trade gains for all country pairs. This is what we do in the 
empirical section.
•	 The	second	term	corresponds	to	the	positive	political	spillover	of	RTAs.	A higher 
probability of war δe increases the likelihood of signing an RTA. Because sign-
ing an RTA allows to reduce the level of asymmetric information, it reduces the 
probability of escalation to war by  ε pol percent. Note that this political gain of 
RTAs is large when the potential welfare loss of war W is large.
•	 The	third	term	interacts	trade	gains	with	the	probability	of	war.	The	sign	of	
this term is ambiguous. It is positive if the elasticity of escalation to the cost 
of war is suffiiciently large, i.e., if  ε cost > 1. Two effects indeed go in oppo-
site directions: on the one hand a high probability of conflict δe reduces the 
expected gain of an RTA because these gains are lost in times of war. On the 
other hand, a high probability of conflict also means that the pacifying effect 
of an RTA is very valuable. If policymakers believe that RTAs are indeed 
strong elements of pacification, this second effect dominates, and we expect 
this interaction term to enter with a positive sign.9
•	 The	c term on the right-hand side is the political cost of negotiation: it is linked 
to the current state of relations between the two countries.
8 In the next section, our empirical estimates show that the magnitude of T is approximately 1 percentage point 
of welfare. This is far below the existing estimates of the average cost of war W that can be found in the empirical 
literature (see Glick and Taylor 2010).
9 An alternative interpretation of the interaction term between probability of conflict and trade gains can be 
provided. The total cost of war can be decomposed in the sum of nontrade-related welfare losses (death toll, 
 destructions, …), Ω, and of trade-related welfare losses (returning to bilateral autarky). This itself could be posi-
tively correlated to the trade gains generated by an RTA: αT. With such an assumption, W = Ω + αT, so that 
equation (4) becomes: Γ ≡ T +  ε pol δe × (Ω + αT ) + ( ε cost − 1)(δe × T ) ≥ c. If trade-related welfare losses due 
to a war are positively correlated to trade gains from an RTA, the interpretation of the interaction term (both from 
a theoretical and empirical point of view) changes: it represents both the economic opportunity cost of war and the 
trade gains arising from the “security spillover” of an RTA that improve the bilateral relationship.
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•	 Consider	now	the	effect	of	multilateral	openness.	One	theoretical	and	empirical	
result in Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008a) is that multilateral trade openness 
reduces the opportunity cost of a bilateral war and, therefore, increases the prob-
ability that a dispute escalates into a war. The rationale is that multilateral trade 
openness provides alternative trade partners and reduces bilateral trade depen-
dence with the countries with which a dispute could escalate. Hence, in the con-
text of our framework, an increase in multilateral openness has two opposite 
effects. It corresponds to a decrease in the cost of war W and an increase in the 
probability of escalation e. Assuming that a change in multilateral openness has 
these effects, we can write the cost of war as W = (1 − ω) W 0 and the probability 
of escalation as e = (1 +  ε cost ω) e 0 with ω as a measure of multilateral openness, 
W 0 is the cost of war and  e 0 the escalation likelihood when ω = 0. Substituting 
into equation (4) we obtain
(5)  T +  ε pol δ e 0  W 0 + ( ε cost − 1)(δ e 0 × T ) 
 + ( ε cost − 1)( ε pol  W 0 +  ε cost T )(δ e 0 × ω) ≥ c.
The coefficient of the interaction term (δ e 0 × ω)  is positive when  ε cost > 1. 
Hence, when the elasticity of escalation e to the cost of war is large enough, mul-
tilateral trade openness and the probability of war are expected to have a posi-
tive and complementary impact on the probability of RTA formation. Political 
motives therefore imply that multilateral trade openness gives an incentive to 
sign RTAs to country pairs prone to conflict. The intuition is that an RTA is a 
way to compensate the potentially destabilizing consequence of multilateral 
trade openness. The incentive to do so increases with the probability of war. 
This result supports the view that the development of multilateralism during the 
1980s and early 1990s could have triggered the wave of regionalism in the late 
1990s. This echoes a recent empirical finding by Fugazza and Robert-Nicoud 
(2011) that in the US case multilateralism has pushed toward regionalism. They 
indeed find that the extent of post-Uruguay Round RTAs (in terms of included 
tariff lines) is positively affected by the extent of MFN tariff cuts negotiated by 
the US during the Urugay Round. While Fugazza and Robert-Nicoud (2011) 
provide no theory for their intriguing finding, our results suggest that this emu-
lator effect of multilateralism on regionalism could also be driven by security 
purposes.
C. Empirical Implementation
We now present the econometric implementation of our model of RTA forma-
tion. To this purpose, we relax the assumption of identical countries. Considering a 
country pair (i, j) at year t, equation (4) implies that a regional trade agreement is 
signed when
(6)  Γ ijt >  c ijt .
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In this equation,  Γ ijt is the utility gain from signing the agreement, and  c ijt cor-
responds to the negotiation cost. Empirically,  c ijt is the unobserved component of 
the decision process, submitted to stochastic shocks in political affinity for instance, 
which transforms (6) into a probability of RTA formation. The functional form 
taken by this probability depends upon the distribution assumed on  c ijt . With a 
Gumbel/Type I extreme value distribution (see Train 2003), we obtain the logit 
probability to be estimated using maximum likelihood:
(7)  ℙ(RT A ijt = 1) =  exp( Γ ijt )_  exp( Γ ijt ) + 1 ,
where the dependent variable RT A ijt is a dummy coding for the existence of an RTA 
between i and j in year t, and  Γ ijt follows from equation (4):
(8)   Γ ijt = α +  β 1 min(  Tijt ,   Tjit ) +  β 2 WA R ij +  β 3 min(  Tijt ,   Tjit ) 
 × WA R ij + β Z ijt .
In the previous equation, (  Tijt ,   Tjit ) correspond to our empirical estimates of the RTA-
induced trade gains; they are retrieved from the estimation procedure described in 
Section IIB. We consider the country-pair minimum min(  Tijt ,   Tjit ) as a consequence 
of our assumption that RTA formation must be Pareto-improving in absence of any 
compensatory transfers within the country pair.10 In our robustness analysis, we 
allow for the possibility of transfers by measuring trade gains with the country-pair 
average (  Tijt +   Tjit )/2 rather than the minimum. WA R ij is a proxy for the probability 
of war (see the discussion in Section IIC on how we measure this variable),  Z ijt is a 
set of control variables. We include these to filter out potential correlation between 
our main explanatory variables and the residual term  c ijt that captures cross-country 
pair unobserved heterogeneity in the political costs of negotiation. These controls 
are discussed below.
In equation (8) we expect  β 1 to be positive. The coefficient  β 2 tests for the existence 
of a political spillover of RTA. It is expected to be nonnegative. The  interpretation 
of the sign of  β 3 , the coefficient of the interaction term, can be misleading in a 
logit specification due to the nonlinearity of this model (see Ai and Norton 2003). 
The logit specification also makes the handling of panel data techniques, such as 
within estimation, more complicated, while the marginal effects tend to be similar 
to the Linear Probability Model (LPM) in many cases, as shown in Angrist and 
Pischke (2009, 107). Hence in all specifications of (8), where the interaction term 
is included, we estimate a linear probability model rather than a logit model. This 
10 In our setup, the two countries, i and j, are assumed to be symmetric for the sake of exposition. Relaxing 
this assumption and ignoring compensatory transfers, the condition (4) is now country-specific given that the trade 
gains ( T ij ,  T ji )  are potentially asymmetric. An RTA is formed when the minimum of the two country-specific condi-
tions (4) is positive.
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standard choice also facilitates the interpretation of the coefficient.11 In that case, 
the coefficient  β 3 corresponds to a marginal effect and it can be simply interpreted 
as a test of complementarity versus substitutability between economic and security 
gains: complementarity ( β 3 > 0) is expected when the opportunity cost channel is at 
work (i.e., the pacifying effect of RTAs is large so that  ε cost > 1).
II. Empirical Analysis
A. Data
There are two main parts to the empirical investigations of this paper. In a first 
step, we estimate the trade gains of RTA formation, which involves essentially run-
ning a gravity equation over a sufficiently long time period to be able to identify the 
trade creation effect of RTA formation in the within country-pair dimension. In a 
second step, we estimate the econometric model of RTA formation that is exposed 
in the previous section.
We make use of the gravity dataset constructed for Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 
(2008a) and Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010), which is described in greater detail in 
those two papers. Essentially, any gravity dataset requires source data for a trade 
flow variable, and a list of gravity controls. The trade flow source is IMF DOTS, 
with a procedure to extract the most possible information from mirror flow declara-
tions. The list of gravity controls includes the classical bilateral distances, contiguity, 
colonial linkages, and common (official) language dummies. All those come from 
the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) distance 
database (http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm). Later in the paper 
we also use a common legal origin dummy available from Andrei Shleifer at http://
post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/qgov_web.xls, and a variable for 
bilateral genetic distance, available from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
More central in our case are the regional trading agreements: RTA dummy is 
the dependent variable of our second and main empirical exercice, which explains 
their formation. RTAs are constructed from three main sources: Table 3 of Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) supplemented with information from the WTO website (http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/summary_e.xls) and qualitative information 
contained in Frankel (1997). The source data for military conflicts is the Correlates 
of War (COW) project (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/). More precisely, we use 
the information contained in the Militarized Interstate Disputes database that lists 
all bilateral interstate conflicts from 1816 to 2001, and quantifies their intensity on 
a 1 to 5 scale12 (for a precise description of the source data, see Martin, Mayer, and 
Thoenig 2008a). We concentrate on the 1870 –2001 period because 1870 is essen-
tially the time when most European countries have a stabilized geographical and 
11 However, an area where logit (or probit) is undoubtedly preferable to LPM relates to the predictions one can 
make when changing one or more variables more than marginally. In that case, probabilities have to be bounded 
between 0 and 1 by the model in order to yield meaningful predictions. In our quantification exercise, we return 
to the logit specification.
12 The scale is the following: 1 = No militarized action, 2 = Threat to use force, 3 = Display of force, 4 = Use 
of force, and 5 = War, defined as a conflict with at least 1,000 deaths of military personnel.
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political structure. As explained below, we will use both an old war and a recent wars 
variable. The old wars variable is computed as the percentage of years with active 
military conflicts between two countries during the 1870 –1944 period. This creates 
an immediate problem with countries that did not exist in this period. What is the 
historical war propensity of the pair Algeria–Nigeria for instance? Due to the absence 
of detailed information on conflicts for all pairs of ex-colonies and all years prior 
to independence, we envision several strategies, which range from assuming peace 
to dropping those observations. Those strategies and results are detailed below in the 
results section. Recent wars are taken to be the same percentage of military conflicts, 
but for a moving window of 20 years before the year under consideration. For both 
variables, we consider only the two most severe types of wars, coded 4 and 5 in the 
COW database (see Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008a for examples).
In those regressions, there are other bilateral political variables, which serve as 
controls in the list of RTA determinants. Those include the correlation of roll-call 
votes recorded for the two countries in the General Assembly of the United Nations 
(from Gartzke et al. 1999), a dummy for the existence of a military alliance (from 
COW), and the sum of democracy indices (from Polity IV).
B. Estimating the Trade Gains of RTA
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to estimate the econometric 
model characterized by equations (6), (7), and (8). Nevertheless the first task is to 
obtain (  Tijt ,   Tjit ), the estimates for the trade gains of RTA formation between coun-
tries (i, j) at date t. The existing literature on RTA formation (Baier and Bergstrand 
2004; Egger and Larch 2008) proxies those gains with the standard gravity covari-
ates, such as economic size, geographical distance, remoteness, contiguity, etc., in a 
reduced-form estimation of RTA formation. Given that our purpose is to understand 
the relation between economic and political factors, we cannot follow the same 
route. Indeed it is extremely likely that the gravity covariates affect both economic 
and political factors. Hence, we rely on a theory-driven empirical strategy to assess 
the trade gains of RTA formation and to disentangle them from the political factors.
Let us consider the wide class of trade models where aggregate welfare is derived 
from a CES utility function.13 We now use subscripts for countries and time.14 
Country i welfare at date t is given by
(9)   U it =  E it / P it ,
where  E it is nominal GDP and  P it is the price index. The price index can be written as
(10)   P it = [  ∑ 
k
 
 
 μ kt  τ kit 1−σ ] 1/(1−σ) ,
13 Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) show that a general class of models, where the “import 
demand system is CES” (among other conditions), exhibit the same welfare effect from a change in trade costs. 
This class of models includes Krugman (1980) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), but also Melitz (2003) and 
Eaton and Kortum (2002).
14 One adjustment we must make to our setup when applying it empirically is to account for heterogeneity 
between different country pairs, and variance in the time dimension.
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where σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods,  μ kt stands for all factors 
in the model that makes country k a good exporter,15 and  τ kit 1−σ represents bilateral 
trade freeness, where  τ kit > 1 is the iceberg-type price shifter that accounts for all 
trade barriers. In this context, bilateral trade obeys the following gravity equation 
governing imports of i from j in year t :
(11)   m jit =  μ jt  E it  P it σ−1  τ jit 1−σ .
We estimate the welfare gains of an RTA between countries i and j in a partial equilib-
rium framework. A full-blown general equilibrium analysis should take into account 
the fact that each envisioned bilateral RTA triggers an endogenous response of supply 
conditions in all countries of the world. To take a concrete example, in the Krugman 
(1980) model,  P it = [  ∑ k    n kt  p kt 1−σ  τ kit 1−σ  ] 1/(1−σ) and  p k are a function of local factor costs, 
usually assumed to be limited to labor costs,  w k . By changing the worldwide trade 
costs matrix, each RTA affects not only the two participants, but also third countries: 
all  n k and  w k are therefore potentially affected. Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007), 
extended by Ossa (2011) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), and applied by 
Caliendo and Parro (2011) to the context of RTA evaluation, have initiated a litera-
ture that takes those effects into account. With the exception of Ossa (2011), those 
papers focus on the case of factor immobility and consider how arbitrary changes in 
trade costs (RTAs in our case) affect welfare through endogenous changes in both 
the price index P and wages w for each country in the world. The Dekle, Eaton, and 
Kortum method shows how to write the model as a system of two sets of n non-linear 
equations, one for changes in P, the other for changes in w, where n is the number of 
countries considered. The system is solved numerically, using measured, calibrated, or 
estimated values of structural parameters of the model, in particular trade elasticities, 
but also the share of labor in the economy, overall trade balance, and initial trade pat-
terns, depending on the specific version of the model that is used.16
Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) apply this general equilibrium numerical method 
to rebalancing of trade by 40 countries in 2004; Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) 
look at the effect of a uniform trade cost fall of 10 percent in 1986 on 113 countries; 
Ossa (2011) considers Nash-type tariff setting for 7 countries in 2004; and Caliendo 
and Parro (2011) evaluate the impact of North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) from 1994 to 2005. While it is possible to apply Caliendo and Parro (2011) 
to our case, note that our problem is far more demanding computationally, since we 
need to contemplate the impact of a potential RTA for all pairs of countries for about 
50 years. We consider this to be an important endeavor but beyond the scope of the 
present paper, and prefer to leave it for further research.17 A second limitation of the 
partial equilibrium framework we adopt is that we ignore tariff revenues. This gener-
ates measurement error in our empirical estimate of the RTA trade gains, which are 
15 In the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model for instance, this term is  n kt  p kt 1−σ , a positive function of the number of 
varieties, and negative one of the price charged by firms located in k.
16 Note that this framework is general enough to be applied to most of the usual trade models, and is very related 
in this respect to the Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) result of welfare change equivalence between 
those different models.
17 Note also that our results are of the same order of magnitude as the general equilibrium estimates, see below.
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certainly overestimated. There are two fundamental hurdles that make tariff losses 
from RTAs difficult to account for in our work. First, we would encounter the gen-
eral equilibrium issues just described, since tariff revenue changes depend on how 
each RTA effects supply and demand conditions in all countries of the world. Again, 
one would need to apply the methodology of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) and 
Caliendo and Parro (2011) to estimate these tariff revenue changes in a general equi-
librium framework. Second, even within a partial equilibrium approach, estimating 
lost tariff revenues would require data on bilateral tariff schedules for the past 50 years. 
Such data is simply not available, even at a very aggregate level.
Hence, we stick to a framework maintaining analytical solutions that can be 
brought to the data by considering only the price index,  P it , effect of RTA formation, 
leaving wages in the world unaffected. The level of  P it depends on the existence of 
an RTA through the bilateral trade barriers in equation (10):
(12)   τ jit ≡ exp(− ρ RT A jit ) η jit ,
where  η jit is the residual component of trade costs, while RT A ijt is a dummy variable 
set equal to one when an RTA is in force between i and j in t. The parameter ρ depends 
directly on the preferential tariff cut. Importantly, we assume ρ to be the same across 
all agreements. This is clearly a simplifying assumption. However, we believe it to be 
a reasonable approximation of long-run effects of RTAs as World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules demand the RTA go to a zero tariff bound after ten years (see GATT Art 
XXIV, Ad Art XXIV and its updates, including the 1994 “Understanding”).
We can combine equations (12), (9), and (10) to obtain  T ijt , the percentage change 
in utility of i following an RTA with j :
(13)   T ijt = [  ∑ k    μ kt  η kit 1−σ    ___    μ jt exp[(σ− 1)ρ] η jit 1−σ +  ∑ k≠j    μ kt  η kit 1−σ   ] 1/(1−σ) − 1.
We estimate this equation using bilateral trade data over the 1950 –2000 period (see 
Section IIA for the data description). This requires several steps. First, we use our 
definition of trade costs (12) in the gravity equation (11) to obtain a new version of 
the gravity equation:
(14)  ln  m jit = ln  μ jt + ln( E it  P it σ−1 ) + (σ − 1)ρ RT A jit + (1 − σ) ln  η jit .
That can be estimated by a panel specification:
(15)  ln  m jit = f X jt + f M it + λ RT A jit +  u jit ,
where  u jit is the error term, f X jt is an exporter × year fixed effect, and f M it is an 
importer × year fixed effect. This specification has the advantage of remaining flex-
ible in terms of the exact underlying trade model, while enabling the extraction of 
the parameters of interest for the calculation of the utility change in (13). Indeed, 
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comparing (14) and (15), one obtains  μ jt = exp( ˆ  fX jt ) , exp((σ− 1) ρ) = exp(  λ) , 
and  η jit 1−σ = exp(  ujit ).
Our panel contains bilateral trade flows over the 1950 –2000 period. We exploit 
the within dimension of this dataset, in order to identify   λ from entries and exits 
into the agreements rather than from a comparison across country pairs. Thus, in 
(15), we allow  u jit to be additively decomposed into a time-invariant and a time-
varying element. The regression also includes year dummies. Finally, due to the 
potential existence of time-varying codeterminants of RTA formation and trade 
flows in (15), we instrument RT A jit using the contagion index derived by Baldwin 
and Jaimovich (2009): contagio n jit =  ∑ k≠i, j   export shar e ikt RT A jkt . This index sum-
marizes the threat of trade diversion suffered by country i in market j, by weighting 
the count of RTAs signed between j and k with the share of k in i’s exports.18 Our 
point estimate of   λ is 0.258 (the uninstrumented estimate being 0.311), yielding a 
predicted increase in bilateral trade of 29 percent from entry into an RTA. For com-
parison purposes, Baier and Bergstrand (2007), using bilateral fixed effects and year 
dummies on a panel (for every five years) from 1960 –2000, find an estimate of 0.68 
(last column of their table 4). Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010) find 0.383 using their 
tetradic method, which is most comparable with the method used here (none of the 
cited papers instruments the RTA dummy, however).
Our second step retrieves those point estimates and substitutes them into equation 
(13). This gives us our empirical estimate of the trade gains of RTA:
(16)   Tijt = [   ∑ k   exp( ˆ  fX kt +   ukit )     ____   exp(  λ +  ˆ  fX jt +   ujit ) +  ∑ k≠j   exp( ˆ  fX kt +   ukit )   ] 1/(1−σ) − 1,
where we use the standard calibration for the elasticity of substitution in the empiri-
cal trade literature σ = 5.19
Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 describe our trade gains variable   Tijt . In Figure 1, we 
plot the average estimated trade gains of joining an RTA for two types of country 
pairs: those that do enter a bilateral RTA at some point in our sample, and those that 
do not. For the second group, we want to make it as comparable as possible to the 
first one, and therefore, we keep only those country pairs where both members do 
enter an RTA with a third country but do not sign a bilateral one.20 The horizontal 
axis has the number of years before the signature of the bilateral RTA for those who 
sign it and the number of years until year 2000 for the control group. The difference 
in trends is clear: the RTA signatories have estimated trade gains that grow as we get 
closer to the actual signing, whereas nothing visible happens in the control group. 
This suggests that our measure of trade gains from an RTA can be used as a predictor 
18 Detailed first-stage results available upon request show that the contagion index is an extremely powerful 
instrument of RTA signatures.
19 Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 5, the workhorse model for computable general equilibrium 
analysis of trade liberalization retains an average estimate of 5.3 (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002). Econometric 
evidence by Hertel et al. (2007) point to an average elasticity of substitution of 7.0, while Broda and Weinstein 
(2006) estimate a mean σ of 4.0 for their most recent period and a 3-digit classification (their table IV).
20 This restriction does not affect radically the shape of the curve. When comparing with the whole set of coun-
try pairs, which do not sign a bilateral RTA, the graph looks almost the same.
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of the decision to enter a bilateral RTA, both in the cross-section in the years before 
the signature, and in the within dimension, looking at when countries decide to sign. 
The variation of   T across time comes from the changes in the price index decrease 
that would come with an RTA. As a partner country constitutes an increasing share 
of your price index, the gain from signing an RTA with this country grows. The 
source of variance across time and country pairs for T is the variance in bilateral 
trade barriers η and in exporting country competitiveness μ (see equation 13).
Figure 1. Utility Gains RTA/No Bilateral RTA
Figure 2. Utility Gains Average RTA/EU15
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Table 1—Estimated Trade Gains for the Top 50 Country Pairs in 1956
Trade gains
Country pair
Minimum T
(percent)
Mean T 
(percent)
Bil. open. 
min  
imports
 _
GDP
  
(percent) Dist. kms Ever RTA?
SUN CHN 1.95 2.919 0.622 5,507 No
USA CAN 1.786 3.399 0.748 2,079 Yes
NLD BEL 1.054 1.261 4.38 161 Yes
CZS SUN 1.031 1.891 0.323 2,388 No
POL SUN 0.741 1.715 0.231 2,067 No
SYR LBN 0.667 1.064 2.917 228 No
CAN GBR 0.637 0.718 1.661 5,850 No
ROM SUN 0.617 2.294 0.192 2,142 No
FRA DEU 0.57 0.789 1.019 790 Yes
POL CZS 0.568 0.701 0.743 387 No
NLD DEU 0.564 0.976 1.009 379 Yes
GBR AUS 0.546 1.899 1.128 16,602 No
BEL FRA 0.546 0.754 0.559 526 Yes
BRA ARG 0.498 0.555 0.855 2,392 Yes
USA GBR 0.488 0.713 0.199 6,878 No
USA BRA 0.469 1.346 0.191 8,089 No
GBR NZL 0.457 2.165 0.942 18,521 No
USA VEN 0.444 2.249 0.181 4,204 No
FRA MAR 0.424 1.986 0.433 1,706 Yes
SUN FIN 0.385 0.665 0.119 1,635 No
BGR SUN 0.381 1.84 0.118 2,391 No
BEL DEU 0.38 0.789 0.677 423 Yes
FRA IRQ 0.376 0.384 0.383 3,805 No
CZS CHN 0.369 0.429 0.161 7,790 No
DEU SWE 0.361 1.017 0.643 929 Yes
USA JPN 0.352 1.49 0.143 10,286 No
DEU ITA 0.346 0.671 0.615 1,014 Yes
AUT ITA 0.338 0.479 0.506 701 Yes
GBR SWE 0.337 0.702 0.692 1,293 Yes
GBR IND 0.329 1.161 0.676 7,324 No
GBR NLD 0.319 0.483 0.657 468 Yes
HUN SUN 0.319 1.066 0.098 2,334 No
USA DEU 0.312 0.713 0.127 7,595 No
JPN PHL 0.301 0.535 0.432 2,957 No
SWE NOR 0.29 0.676 0.766 503 Yes
USA CUB 0.289 2.737 0.118 2,581 No
POL CHN 0.287 0.288 0.125 7,457 No
GBR DNK 0.285 1.008 0.585 920 Yes
IRN IND 0.274 0.362 0.235 2,916 No
NLD FRA 0.274 0.276 0.284 661 Yes
SAU JPN 0.273 0.315 0.512 8,854 No
ITA SAU 0.273 0.323 0.408 3,586 No
CHE DEU 0.273 1.024 0.484 543 Yes
JPN IND 0.267 0.349 0.372 6,003 No
SWE DNK 0.266 0.464 0.703 450 Yes
USA MEX 0.264 2.733 0.107 2,468 Yes
NLD SWE 0.261 0.402 1.433 1,009 Yes
GBR FRA 0.261 0.337 0.422 750 Yes
NOR DNK 0.26 0.263 1.047 560 Yes
CHE ITA 0.26 0.485 0.388 610 Yes
note: Lines in boldface indicate pairs that sign the Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
a year later.
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Figure 2 focuses on the set of countries that do enter an RTA, and distinguishes 
the European Union members (defined as EU15) from others. We are also able to 
look at what happens to our measure of trade gains after the RTA signature. One 
can observe that the trend before signature continues afterwards. This is not surpris-
ing: RTA gains come from trade creation, and it is therefore logical that comparing 
our measure of utility gains before and after the RTA implementation reflects the 
amount of trade created within the pair. Hence, there is potentially a reverse causal-
ity from RTA formation on the trade gains. This points to an important methodologi-
cal issue that we address in Section IIID.
In Table 1 we report the estimated trade gains in 1956, one year before the Rome 
Treaty, for the subsample of 50 country-pairs (out of a sample of 8,240) for which 
the trade gains are the largest. We report the country-pair minimum, min(  Tijt ,   Tjit ) 
and the country pair unweighted average, (  Tijt +    Tjit )/2. There may be a large dis-
crepancy between these two figures, especially in asymmetric country-pairs where 
the smallest country tends to gain much more than the biggest country. In our econo-
metric specifications we focus on the country-pair minimum because it is the theo-
retically grounded one when welfare transfers and compensation schemes between 
trade partners are difficult to implement. The interpretation of the table is the fol-
lowing: in 1956, the United States and Canada would have increased their welfare at 
least by 1.8 percent if they had formed an RTA.21 Note also that one year before the 
Rome Treaty, the country pairs composed of the European Economic Community 
founding countries (in bold) are in the group of large trade winners, but not system-
atically among the top ones.
The estimated trade gains are small. For instance, in Figure 1, our estimate of the 
average gain from entering an RTA (at the year of signature) is 0.11 percent. This order 
of magnitude is not inconsistent with standard results of trade gains estimates based 
on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis. A recent example evaluating 
the impact of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas by Hertel et al. (2007) finds 
an estimate average utility gain for potential members of 0.25 percent (their table 5). 
In the recent general equilibrium literature inspired by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum 
(2007), the welfare gains also turn out to be quite modest. Caliendo and Parro (2011) 
for instance, estimate that the consequence of a counterfactual cancelling of NAFTA 
would be a drop in welfare of 0.3 percent for the United States, 1.5 percent for Mexico, 
and 1.4 percent for Canada. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) simulate a 10 percent 
reduction in all bilateral impediments to trade worldwide in 1986, and obtain gains that 
are typically within the 0 to 5 percent range (1 percent for the United States, 4 percent 
for Canada, 3 percent for Germany, and 2 percent for France, for instance).
Finally, our estimate of ρ(σ − 1) = 0.26 together with the assumption σ = 5 
implies that ρ = 0.065. Denoting t the tariff cut following RTA formation, we have 
exp(− ρ) ≡ 1/(1 + t). Hence, the estimated average tariff cut is approximatively 
6.7 percent for our sample over the 1950 –1990 period. This order of magnitude 
is plausible given, for example, that the difference between MFN and preferential 
tariff is reported in 2009 by Fugazza and Nicita (2011) to be small, at 2.2 percent. 
21 Regarding this United States-Canada example, the percentage increase in welfare is 1.8 percent for the United 
Staes and 5 percent for Canada, such as the country-pair average increase is 3.4 percent.
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The reason is that in 2009 the MFN tariff had decreased substantially after several 
decades of multilateral liberalization.22
C. Measuring Conflictuality
In equation (8), in addition to   T the trade gains, the second central variable is 
WAR, the probability of war. In order to diminish any issue of reverse causality, 
we proxy the probability of war at date t, WA R ijt , with the country-pair frequency 
of bilateral wars that occurred between 1870 and 1945. We call it frequency of old 
wars. This proxy being time invariant, we suppress the time index, which gives the 
variable WA R ij in the econometric equation (8). The frequency of old wars, WA R ij, 
therefore proxies for the bilateral probability of war (δe in equation (4)). We also 
control for the frequency of recent wars, which we view as both increasing the 
political cost of RTA negotiation c and being correlated with WA R ij . This should 
alleviate part of the correlation between old wars and the residual. Recent wars are 
very likely to be related also to δe, since empirical evidence suggests that bilateral 
war probability is stable over time (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004). In order 
to identify δe and c, we need recent wars to contain additional information about 
c, while controlling for δe in the regression through the inclusion of old wars. The 
identifying assumption is therefore that recent wars raise the political cost of subse-
quent bilateral negotiations, but this effect on the cost then decreases over time. One 
way to think about this is that feelings of revenge and grievance that follow a war 
are most vivid just after a war, and then “depreciate” over time (see Mocan 2008 in 
a different context). For recent wars, we use the country-pair frequency of bilateral 
wars that occurred during the last 20 years. In our robustness analysis we test defini-
tions of old and recent wars with alternative time spans.
D. Endogeneity Issues
The estimates of our main coefficients of interest,  β 1 ,  β 2 ,  β 3 , are potentially con-
taminated by several sources of endogeneity, which we now discuss.
Measurement Error: Relying on the old history of conflicts helps to reduce 
reverse causality issues (from RTA negotiation to war) but introduces noise in 
the measurement of currently relevant war probability. Some causes of disputes 
in the late nineteenth century (e.g., the building of colonial empires) may have 
lost their explanatory power. Simultaneously, new causes have emerged in the 
late twentieth century (oil production; access to water supply; religious tensions). 
Those time-varying determinants imply measurement error in the current probabil-
ity of war. This should go against our results by inducing a bias toward zero in the 
estimated coefficients of interest.
As discussed in Section IIB, our estimate of the trade gains,   Tijt , relies on a partial 
equilibrium analysis and is therefore a noisy measure of  T ijt , the true trade gains. This 
22 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to us this computation.
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could bias  β 1 and  β 3 , the two coefficients involving   Tijt , toward zero, underestimating 
the magnitude of the effects we are trying to identify. However, we see no particular 
reason why the measurement error (   Tijt −  T ijt ), which is part of the error term, should 
be correlated with our other variable of interest, WA R ij , which should leave the esti-
mate of  β 2 unaffected by this measurement error problem.
Reverse Causality: Figure 2 highlights the possible reverse causality link from 
RTA to trade gains following RTA formation. In order to eliminate this issue that 
can overestimate the coefficient  β 1 , we need to compare   Tijt across country pairs or 
time before the agreement actually takes place. Similarly, this reverse causality issue 
may bias downward  β 2 because RTA formation is likely to reduce the probability 
of future conflicts. In the cross-section dimension, we thus estimate equation (8) 
in year t = 2000 for dyads where an RTA does not exist in 2000. For dyads where 
the two countries are members of an RTA in 2000, their RHS variables are set to 
their values one year before the RTA formation. For example, in the case of United 
States-Canada, this means that all the RHS variables take their 1988 values. This 
methodology generalizes the approach by Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and allows 
us to control for reverse causation. Correspondingly, in the panel estimates of (8), 
we focus on “RTA onset,” that is we analyze, for each dyad, years up to the signature 
of the RTA, dropping observations after the signature. This is very similar to the 
method used by researchers studying the determinants of conflicts (Fearon 2005).
Omitted Variables: In equation (8), the coefficients of economic gain and of its 
interaction term with the probability of war,  β 1 and  β 3 , could be contaminated by 
omitted co-determinants of trade gains,   Tijt , and of unobserved political costs of 
RTA formation,  c ijt (i.e., the residual). This may arise because the structural rela-
tionship (16) defining   Tijt depends on   ujit , the estimate of (logged) bilateral trade 
freeness retrieved from the auxiliary gravity equation (14). Indeed, several deter-
minants of bilateral trade freeness (or conversely trade barriers) might also affect 
the bilateral political affinity, and consequently the political costs of RTA formation 
(e.g., commonality of language and culture, economic embargo, etc.). A striking 
illustration is provided in Michaels and Zhi (2010), who show that the deterioration 
of political relations between the US and France over the 2002–2006 period resulted 
in a significant increase in their bilateral trade barriers following changes in attitudes 
in the United States toward France.
To address this concern, we first add to the set of control variables  Z ijt a series of 
codeterminants of bilateral trade barriers and political relations. This encompasses 
the standard time invariant gravity controls (distance, contiguity, common language, 
etc.) and various time-varying proxies of bilateral political affinity, such as a dummy 
variable coding for the existence of a military alliance, a measure of bilateral cor-
relation in UN votes from Gartzke et al. (1999), and lastly the country-pair sum 
of democracy indices from the Polity IV database. Indeed, the democratic peace 
hypothesis, which has been studied by both political scientists and economists (see 
Levy and Razin 2004 for a recent explanation of the hypothesis) states that demo-
cratic countries are less prone to violence. But democratic countries are also more 
open to trade. In the panel specifications, we can be more general in those controls, 
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by including a country-pair fixed effect to purge from remaining time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity.
In spite of all these controls, we cannot rule out the possibility that the coefficient 
of trade gains,  β 1 , is still contaminated by unobserved time-varying codeterminants 
of bilateral trade freeness,   ujit , and political affinity,  c ijt . To solve this last problem, 
we directly include   ujit as a control variable. This strategy allows us to identify  β 1 by 
exploiting the variations in trade gains   Tijt net of   ujit . This solves the omitted variable 
problem because those variations are not driven by bilateral shocks and so cannot be 
correlated with the (residual and unobserved) political costs of negotiations  ϵ jit . Indeed, 
a look at the structural relationship (16) makes it clear that those variations are driven 
by changes in the exporter fixed effects  ˆ  fX kt . This strategy is in fact akin to a control 
function approach where the trade gains   Tijt are instrumented with a remoteness index 
based on the exporter fixed effects  ˆ  fX kt (see Imbens and Wooldridge 2007).
Regarding  β 2 and  β 3 , the coefficients of the probability of war and of its interaction 
term with trade gains in the econometric specification (8), the omitted variable prob-
lem is potentially severe. Any time-invariant determinant of the unobserved political 
costs of RTA formation  c ijt , is also likely to affect the underlying probability of war, 
WA R ij . For example, disputes linked to common borders, natural resources, migra-
tion waves, etc., are likely to increase the underlying probability of war and make 
negotiation on RTA formation politically more costly. This suggests that the omitted 
variable problem should induce a downward bias which goes against our hypothesis. 
Note that the various gravity and political affinity controls included in  Z ijt are likely 
to absorb most of the cross-sectional variations in bilateral disputes. We also include, 
as a control variable, a measure of bilateral genetic distance. Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2009) show that genetic relatedness has a positive effect on bilateral conflict pro-
pensities in the cross-section. This is because more closely related populations, on 
average, tend to interact more and develop more disputes over sets of common issues. 
Hence, we expect genetic distance to reduce the probability of war and to increase 
the probability of RTA formation. Finally, in our panel estimates, we include country-
pair fixed effects. This makes impossible the identification of  β 2 , the coefficient of the 
time-invariant variable WA R ij . Nevertheless, we can still estimate  β 3, which is now 
immune to the omitted variable bias. There is no particular reason for the determi-
nants of political costs  c ijt to have a larger effect on RTA formation in dyads where 
trade gains are larger.
III. Results
A. Econometric Estimates
We start in Table 2 with a cross-sectional analysis of RTA determinants. By cross-
sectional we mean that we take the world in the year 2000, and attempt to explain 
which of the country pairs are in an RTA. Some determinants will be time invariant 
(e.g., distance), some will have a time dimension. For the latter set of variables, we 
consider the variable for the year immediately preceding the signature of the RTA. For 
instance, trade gains are taken in 1956 (the year before the Rome Treaty) for the Franco-
German case, and in 1993 (the year before NAFTA) for the United States-Mexico 
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one. Since this variable is calculated as a percentage of utility, it is relevant at the 
moment of the decision, and can be compared across observations.
Our first column is a logit with only the log of the estimated trade gains as an 
explanatory variable for RTA formation.23 Its coefficient is positive and significant. 
With an  R 2 around 0.24 in the context of a logit specification, the explanatory 
power of this variable is very large. The fact that this variable alone is sufficient to 
explain more than a quarter of the observed variance in RTA formation provides 
encouraging empirical support to our theory-driven estimate of trade gains. In the 
second column, we estimate a similar specification with our second main explana-
tory variable only, namely the frequency of old wars. Again the coefficient is posi-
tive, very significant, with a high explanatory power (i.e.,  R 2 close to 0.06). In 
column 3, both variables are included; their respective coefficients and statistical 
significance remain stable with respect to the estimates of the first two columns. In 
columns 1–3, the old war variable WA R ij is restricted to the small number of dyads 
which existed before 1945. In particular, all country pairs that involve a former col-
ony (India-Japan, Germany-Ivory Coast for instance) are dropped from this regres-
sion. In column 4, we adopt the following alternative strategy: we set WA R ij , the old 
war variable, to 0 for country pairs that did not exist before 1945; we also include 
a dummy variable coding for those pairs. As can be seen from the comparison of 
columns 3 and 4, the two variables of interest have very close coefficients with this 
procedure and the fit is very comparable, which makes us confident that it does not 
alter our results while substantially augmenting the number of observations.24 We 
maintain this procedure throughout.
23 We take the log because of the left-skewness of the distribution of estimated trade gains.
24 It can be noted that those nonexisting dyads, mostly combinations of colonies at the end of WWII, have been 
less involved in the RTA movement, as revealed by the negative coefficient of the dummy variable.
Table 2—RTA Determinants, Benchmark Regressions
Model
 Dependent variable
RTA
(1)
RTA
(2)
RTA
(3)
RTA
(4)
RTA
(5)
Period 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Trade gains (  Tijt ) 0.589*** 0.553*** 0.415*** 0.330***(0.038) (0.038) (0.019) (0.021)
War frequency pre-1945 (WA R ij ) 11.716*** 7.840*** 8.328*** 9.257***(1.104) (1.337) (1.271) (1.273)
Dyad did not exist pre-1945 − 0.783*** − 0.902***
(0.107) (0.109)
ln bil. trade freeness 0.217*** 
(0.025)
Method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
Sample Pre-1945 pairs Whole Whole
Observations 1,694 2,042 1,694 9,836 9,836
 R 2 0.241 0.065 0.263 0.224 0.240
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Column 5 introduces   ujit , the estimate of bilateral trade freeness obtained from 
the gravity equation (14). As stated above, this is intended to circumvent any con-
tamination of the coefficient on trade gains, by unobserved codeterminants of bilat-
eral trade freeness and political affinity. As expected, this variable enters positively 
and results in a decrease of the effect of trade gains as it purges from contemporane-
ous bilateral affinity, which causes both the probability of signing an RTA and the 
trade gains to be high.
One of our main variables of interest is the interaction term between old wars 
and RTA trade gains. Interaction terms have a nonstraightforward interpretation 
in discrete choice models like the logit, because of their nonlinear nature (Ai and 
Norton 2003). As explained in details above, we therefore resort to a linear probabil-
ity model (LPM), which has the additional advantage of handling fixed effects more 
easily in our panel estimates. Results are in Table 3. Column 1 of Table 3 is simply 
the LPM version of the logit specification (column 5 of Table 2). While this different 
estimation method naturally yields different coefficients, the signs and significance 
levels are preserved. Column 2 introduces the interaction term of trade gains with 
old wars. This interaction term enters positively and is significant at the 1 percent 
level. This supports our hypothesis that trade gains and security gains are comple-
ments. Dyads with large estimated trade gains are more likely to enter an RTA, and 
this effect rises with the historical intensity of wars between the partners.
Column 3 tests our equation (5), namely that multilateral trade openness and the 
probability of war have a positive and complementary impact on the RTA decision. 
As expected, the coefficient of the interaction term between multilateral openness 
and old war is positive and highly significant. In column 3, we also include a num-
ber of bilateral controls. The two most important gravity variables are geographi-
cal distance and contiguity. We also add a list of controls for political affinity (UN 
vote correlation, the sum of Polity IV reported democracy indices, a dummy for 
the existence of a military alliance and an index of genetic distance). All of those 
variables add to the likelihood of belonging to the same agreement as expected. We 
also include the frequency of recent wars, which, according to our discussion in 
Section IIC, is expected to enter negatively through their effect on the political cost 
of negotiations. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 1 percent thresh-
old. The opposite signs of the old wars and recent wars coefficients suggest that a 
“window of opportunity” mechanism is at work. Having had a history of conflicts in 
the past makes a country pair more likely to sign an RTA at the condition that their 
recent history is not too conflicting: Any exogenous event that prevents two ancient 
enemies to fight for some period improves the chances that they sign an RTA, with 
the consequence of reducing further the chances of conflict escalation. We quantify 
the size of those effects later in the paper.
Column 3 establishes our main results with a substantial set of controls, and we 
consider it as our benchmark specification. In spite of the inclusion of all of these 
control variables and the resulting reduction by one-third of the sample size, all 
five coefficients of interest in column 3 keep the expected sign and remain statisti-
cally significant at the 1 percent threshold. According to our discussion in Section IC, 
the fact that the coefficients of the two interaction terms are both positive confirms 
the internal consistency of our setup.
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The two remaining columns extend the sample to the panel dimension. Both speci-
fications include country-pair fixed effects. The coefficient on old wars cannot be 
estimated any more, but its interaction with trade gains can. For each dyad, we aver-
age data over nonoverlapping time windows of five years, a method comparable to 
Egger and Larch (2008) and Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008a) in related work. 
Column 4 considers the full sample. In column 5, we drop observations following the 
signature of RTA for those who do become members. This RTA onset specification is 
very demanding and, in spite of the five-year averaging procedure, it is highly sensi-
tive to measurement errors in the time-series dimension. With respect to the bench-
mark cross-sectional estimates in column 3, all the coefficients of interest keep their 
expected sign and are statistically significant, with the exception of the coefficient 
Table 3—RTA Determinants, Benchmark Regressions, Continued
Model 
 Dependent variable
RTA
(1)
RTA
(2)
RTA
(3)
RTA
(4)
RTA
(5)
Period 2000 2000 2000 1950–2000 1950–2000
Trade gains (  Tijt ) 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.002***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
War frequency pre-1945 (WA R ij ) 1.912*** 5.169*** 7.963*** (0.116) (0.341) (0.757)
Dyad did not exist pre-1945 − 0.053*** − 0.063*** − 0.045*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
ln bil. trade freeness 0.010*** 0.010*** − 0.011*** − 0.003*** − 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Trade gains × wars pre-1945 0.354*** 0.460*** 0.163*** 0.062***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.026) (0.011)
War frequency [ t − 20; t − 1] − 0.441*** − 0.067*** − 0.003
(0.076) (0.019) (0.008)
ln distance − 0.127***
(0.004)
Contiguity 0.095***
(0.018)
UN vote correlation 0.076*** 0.054*** 0.003
(0.011) (0.005) (0.002)
Sum of democracy indexes 0.053*** 0.024*** 0.011***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Military alliance 0.127*** 0.110*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.003)
Genetic distance 0.009**
(0.003)
Multi. openness − 0.021*** 0.004** − 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Multi. openness × wars pre-1945 1.567*** 0.629*** 0.195***
(0.292) (0.053) (0.024)
Method LPM LPM LPM Cty pair FE Cty pair FE
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole
Observations 9,836 9,836 6,152 36,701 35,737
 R 2 0.138 0.147 0.359 0.081 0.017
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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on new wars in the RTA onset specification. An important change is also the size 
of the coefficient on trade gains, when going from RTA (in column 3) to RTA onset 
(in column 4) as a dependent variable. This was to be expected from our analysis of 
Figure 2 and from our discussion of the reverse causality issue: RTAs boost trade 
volumes, which reinforces the RTA-related trade gains after their implementation.
Table 4 pushes further the robustness investigation. Those regressions take col-
umn 3 of Table 3 as a benchmark specification (with gravity controls unreported). In 
the first column, we re-estimate this benchmark specification using logit instead of 
LPM. All signs of the relevant variables remain unchanged. The global explanatory 
power is very high, and the level of significance of the interaction term between old 
wars and trade gains is now slightly above 10 percent (11.5 percent exactly). This 
logit estimate is the one that we use in the quantification section.
In the second column, we return to LPM and extend the set of gravity controls 
to include common language or legal system, colonial linkages, landlockness, and 
remoteness of the country pair. All our variables of interest keep the same sign. 
Column 3 changes the definition of bilateral trade gains to be the average of the 
Table 4—RTA Determinants, Robustness
Model
 Dependent variable
RTA
(1)
RTA
(2)
RTA
(3)
RTA
(4)
RTA
(5)
RTA
(6)
RTA
(7)
Trade gains (  Tijt ) 0.296*** 0.007*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005***(0.042) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
War frequency pre-1945 44.866*** 8.209*** 4.637*** 6.175*** 6.075*** 3.823*** 6.046***
 (WA R ij ) (15.989) (0.754) (0.900) (0.670) (0.662) (0.676) (0.662)
Trade gains × wars 1.582 0.463*** 0.302*** 0.333*** 0.324*** 0.193*** 0.325***
 pre-1945 (1.003) (0.041) (0.071) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
War frequency − 7.423*** − 0.464*** − 0.500*** − 0.188*** − 0.173** − 0.154** − 0.321***
 [ t − 20; t − 1] (2.123) (0.076) (0.081) (0.069) (0.068) (0.066) (0.106)
Multi. openness × wars 17.364*** 1.684*** 0.777   ∗∗ 1.446*** 1.396*** 0.865*** 1.375***
 pre-1945 (5.980) (0.291) (0.325) (0.257) (0.254) (0.253) (0.254)
Multi. openness − 1.995*** − 0.020*** -0.027*** − 0.222*** − 0.216*** − 0.218*** − 0.217***
(0.233) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Number of landlocked − 0.000 − 0.004 − 0.850*** − 0.855*** 0.044 − 0.852***
 in dyad (0.005) (0.006) (0.163) (0.161) (0.156) (0.161)
Common language − 0.019** -0.012 − 0.020*** -0.014* − 0.012 − 0.015*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Colonial link − 0.031 − 0.029 − 0.075*** − 0.066*** − 0.052*** − 0.066***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Common legal origin − 0.002 − 0.010 − 0.003 -0.017*** − 0.011** − 0.017***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Remoteness 0.083*** 0.097*** − 0.126*** − 0.153*** − 0.080*** − 0.152*** 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Same region 0.114*** 0.050*** 0.116***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
War frequency 0.16* 
 [ t − 40; t − 20]  (0.092)
Method Logit LPM LPM Cty FE Cty FE Cty FE Cty FE
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole No EU15 Whole
Trade gains Min Min Average Min Min Min Min
Observations 6,152 6,152 5,274 6,152 6,152 6,071 6,152
 R 2 0.576 0.366 0.350 0.572 0.582 0.518 0.582
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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two countries RTA-related trade gains rather than the minimum. Given that the mini-
mum is always smaller than the average, this translates mechanically into a decrease 
in the coefficient of trade gains.
Column 4 adds a set of dummy variables coding for each country, a feature which 
can be properly identified in our cross-sectional sample of (nondirectional) country 
pairs. These dummy variables control for all time-invariant unobserved characteris-
tics of a country that might make it more likely to fight wars in the past and to sign 
RTAs now. The global fit naturally increases substantially while leaving our results 
of interest remarkably similar. Column 5 adds a dummy to control for the fact that 
the two countries belong to the same geographical region of the world (following 
the World Bank definition of regions). This increases the probability of RTA signifi-
cantly, while again leaving our results on trade gains and conflictuality unaffected.
Column 6 removes intra-EU observations by excluding all country pairs where 
both countries belong to the European Union at 15. This is intended to check that 
our results are not entirely driven by European countries, which are characterized 
both by a rich history of warfares and by the creation of the worldwide deepest trade 
agreement. In this specification, all variables related to wars have slightly—and 
unsurprisingly—smaller coefficients, but they remain very significant.
Column 7 extends our definition of old wars by including a variable that accounts 
for war frequency 20–40 years before RTA signature. This results in a smoother 
representation of the history of wars with very recent ones, those that are more 
than one generation old, and the very old wars (before 1945). The pattern of coef-
ficients is that recent wars tend to reduce the RTA probability, less recent ones tend 
to slightly promote them, while old wars have a much stronger positive effect. This 
finding matches well with our identification strategy: The political and subjective 
costs imposed by recent wars during RTA negotiation are gradually overturned by 
the positive strategic effect of war history. In unreported specifications, we test other 
cutoffs for recent versus old wars; the results were qualitatively unaffected. The 
same is true for a specification where we account for the full history of past wars 
(and not only wars before 1945) without controlling separately for recent wars.
B. Quantification and Counterfactual Experiments
Up to this point, we have mostly analyzed the signs and statistical significance of 
coefficients. We now want to quantify the magnitude of the effects we have identi-
fied. In order to calculate counterfactuals we need to resort to a logit econometric 
model where the RTA probability cannot go outside the 0 –1 range. Moreover, the 
presence of interaction terms, which are the core of our analysis, are not straightfor-
ward in this context.
In all that follows we adopt the following strategy. We start by running a bench-
mark regression using logit (column 1 of Table 4) to estimate the coefficients of 
interest, which gives us the benchmark probability of signing an RTA for each coun-
try pair in the sample. We then select a group of observations, and we run a counter-
factual by attributing to them other values for one or more explanatory variables. For 
instance, we take the country pairs in the lowest decile of the frequency of the old 
war variable and we give them an artificial history of wars. Using the logit formula 
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with the benchmark estimated coefficients, we recalculate their RTA probability and 
compare it with the benchmark probability to evaluate the magnitude of the effect 
of the altered variable. This procedure ensures that the probability remains in the 
admissible range, while doing a “what if” experiment. What if low conflict dyads 
had had an intense past history of warfare, keeping everything else constant?
Complementarity is a first-order Effect.—We first quantify our complementarity 
result between old wars and trade gains in the formation of RTAs. The coefficient of 
the interaction term between trade gains and old wars is positive both in our bench-
mark LPM specification (column 7, Table 2) and in our benchmark logit specification 
(column 1, Table 4). However, Ai and Norton (2003) show that interaction terms have 
a sign that can be deceptive in a logit framework and that cannot be interpreted read-
ily. In the Appendix, we investigate this question more fully by calculating the mar-
ginal effect of this interaction term for the whole range of benchmark probabilities. 
This confirms that the interaction term is indeed positive for nearly all of the sample.
We now turn to the quantification of the interaction term. To this purpose, we 
choose pairs of countries that are located inside the middle decile of those two vari-
ables, that is, around the median level of old wars and trade gains. We then calculate 
the ratio of counterfactual to benchmark probabilities of RTA formation following 
the procedure just described, and spanning over the tenth to the ninety-fifth percen-
tiles of each variable. Results are shown in Figure 3.
In panel A, it is clear that trade gains increase the probability of signing an RTA, 
and that the effect is amplified with old wars. Panel B allows us to better illus-
trate the effect. The x-axis reports trade gains while the y-axis reports the ratio of 
 counterfactual to benchmark probabilities. Each curve corresponds to different lev-
els of old wars. For a dyad that moves from the median to the top 20 percent of trade 
gains, the RTA probability is multiplied by two (1.96) if the dyad is in the middle 
range of old wars, while the multiplicative factor is almost 3 if the same dyad is 
in the top 10 percent of war history.25 We see that the interaction term has a first-
order importance. This confirms our intuition that trade gains are important mostly 
because they allow for an increase in security gains from RTA formation.
Windows of opportunity.—Our second simulation uses the same method described 
at the start of this section to quantify the existence of windows of opportunity during 
which interrupted conflict between old enemies may help sign an RTA and “lock 
in” a more peaceful bilateral relation. The left panel of Figure 4 is very similar to 
the one in Figure 3. We take the whole set of dyads with no history of recent or old 
wars, and gradually move them into the war space, looking at the changes in RTA 
probability. As expected from the point estimates in Tables 2 and 3, recent wars 
reduce the probability of RTA formation, while old ones increase it. The magnitude 
of the effects is substantial. Panel B uncovers an interesting trade off that leaves the 
25 The benchmark probabilities of signing an RTA in this precise sample have an average value of 7.7 percent. 
The median is much lower at 0.75 percent, which shows that most country pairs in the world have a very low RTA 
probability, while a few of them have quite a high one (10 percent of the sample has a benchmark probability higher 
than 20 percent).
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change in RTA probability unchanged. Panel B is a contour plot, where each curve 
represents a probability ratio from panel A. Old wars are on the x-axis, recent wars 
are on the y-axis. Assume a country goes from no old wars to the median level. This 
multiplies its benchmark RTA probability by almost 5 (point A in the figure) if there 
has been very few recent wars, while it leaves the probability unchanged if the level 
of recent wars moves to the top 20 percent (point B in the figure). This shows that a 
change in old wars has in general a larger effect than an equivalent change in recent 
ones (as revealed by the 45 degree line). In other words, if a country pair’s recent 
history of warfare perfectly reflects its long run history, then the net, overall effect of 
war is to increase the probability of RTA formation. By contrast, suppose now that 
we assign the top 5 percent level of old wars to a country pair with no old wars. This 
multiplies by 10 its RTA probability if recent wars are very rare, but only by 3.5 if 
the country is also in the top 5 percent of recent conflicts.
We analyzed pairs that did not experience any conflict in the real world. In Figure 5 
we take the opposite focus, and look at the effect of recent wars on country pairs that 
experienced a large set of conflicts in the recent years. We consider four different 
dyads: India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, Egypt-Israel, and Iran-Turkey. Out of those, 
Figure 3. Complementarity between Trade Gains and Security Gains
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Greece and Turkey are the only ones in an RTA (through the customs union signed 
between the EU and Turkey in 1996).26 For those four pairs, our variable measuring 
the proportion of recent conflicts (over the last 20 sample years) spans from 20 to 
70 percent (4 to 14 years), with associated benchmark probability ranging from 4 
to 80 percent as represented by the black squares on the graph. We then change the 
number of recent conflict years and calculate the new RTA probability.  India-Pakistan 
is perhaps the most impressive example. After five years of peace, the RTA probabil-
ity is multiplied by 5 at 20 percent, after 10 years it jumps to 62 percent. Our results 
also reveal that 4 years of peace between Egypt and Israel brings their RTA probabil-
ity from 23 percent to 57 percent. The effect of recent wars is quite abrupt for pairs 
that fundamentally have a large RTA signature probability (those with large potential 
trade gains, high proximity, …). It thus suggests that the window of opportunity argu-
ment may be well grounded. For those pairs, even a short interruption of outbreaks 
in conflicts can increase RTA probability to a large extent and start a virtuous pacify-
ing process. For Greece-Turkey, we observe the same overall shape of the impact of 
recent conflictuality, and note that in 1996, the conflictuality between the two coun-
tries seemed to have fallen to a level that made RTA possible.
A World without Wars.—Let us consider now another counterfactual experiment. 
Instead of taking the peaceful dyads and making them fight, we make every country 
pair peaceful. The frequencies of old wars, recent wars, and all their  interaction 
terms are set to zero, and the resulting, counterfactual probabilities of RTA forma-
tion are estimated. Results are reported in Figure 6, where the benchmark probability 
26 The recent war frequency variable is therefore calculated for 1976–1996 for Greece-Turkey, and for 
1980 –2000 for the three other pairs.
Figure 5. Window of Opportunity for Four Emblematic Country Pairs
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
S
im
ul
at
ed
 R
T
A
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0 5 10 15 20
Number of conict years in the last 20 years of sample
India-Pakistan
Egypt-Israel
Iran-Turkey
Greece-Turkey
Actual number of conict years
VoL. 4 no. 4 29MARTIn ET AL .: ConfLICTS AnD REGIonAL TRADE AGREEMEnTS
is on the x-axis, while the y-axis gives the counterfactual one (the dashed line cor-
responds to the 45-degree line). Each dot is a dyad, and some are singled out by 
symbols: Grey diamonds represent intra-EU pairs; black crosses represent country 
pairs that were part of the communist bloc at some point; grey squares represent 
pairs that have had a nonzero frequency of recent wars in the real world.
Both EU and former communist country pairs experience a drop in their coun-
terfactual probability of RTA formation with respect to the benchmark one. This is, 
we believe, another illustration of the window of opportunity channel. Indeed, for 
both groups of European countries the history of old wars is very intense. But due 
to the Cold War in particular, recent history was more peaceful as the two blocs 
were very stable internally between the end of WWII and the collapse of the USSR. 
Those 45 years of “forced” peace between countries that used to fight seems to have 
promoted the RTA wave in the region to a large extent.
Regarding the detrimental impact of recent wars, India-Pakistan and Egypt-Israel 
are probably the most illustrative examples. Those two pairs do have a very low 
level of benchmark probability of RTA formation, and this would jump to among 
the highest levels if one could cancel their history of recent wars. Greece-Turkey is 
another striking example.
Multilateralism Triggers Regionalism.—We now quantify the impact of multilat-
eral trade openness on RTA formation. We simply cancel out multilateral globalization 
by setting multilateral trade openness to zero for all pairs of countries. We then esti-
mate the resulting, counterfactual probability of RTA formation that we compare to 
the benchmark probability. Results are reported in Figure 7, where the grey triangles 
represent country pairs with an initial level of multilateral openness above the median 
level and where black circles represent pairs of countries belonging to Mercosur.
Figure 6. The World without Military Conflicts
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We see that in a counterfactual world without multilateral trade openness, most 
country pairs would experience a sharp decrease in their probability of RTA formation. 
This confirms our view that the wave of regionalism observed in the late 1990s could 
be a policy response to the destabilizing, and conflict-promoting, effect of the devel-
opment of multilateralism as experienced during the post-World War period. This 
mechanism is particularly relevant for explaining the formation of Mercosur—a fact 
that has been discussed by policy practitioners (see Manzetti 1993).
IV. Conclusion
Our results suggest that political scientists and historians are right to emphasize 
the political motivation behind RTAs, in particular, the objective of pacifying rela-
tions. However, this does not mean that economics do not matter and that RTAs are 
signed without taking into account their economic benefits—trade gains. On the 
contrary, in absence of trade gains that may be lost during a war, the peace promot-
ing effect of RTAs is greatly weakened. Hence, our story is one where politics and 
economics push in the same direction. Economic and security gains are comple-
mentary to explain the evolving geography of trade agreements. Trade gains may 
be instrumentalized for a superior objective of peace, but that makes them more, 
not less, important. Another important result is the interaction between multilateral 
and regional (or bilateral) trade liberalization. The recent multiplication of RTAs is 
often interpreted as a response of policymakers frustrated by stalling multilateral 
trade negotiations. Our result suggests a radically different story, one where multi-
lateral openness (which may come from multilateral liberalization at WTO or the 
multiplication of RTAs) induces the formation of additional RTAs. RTAs can be 
interpreted as a way to reinforce bilateral economic relations between countries at 
Figure 7. The World without Multilateral Trade
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risk of war at a time when globalization reduces the bilateral economic dependence 
of these countries. The domino theory of regionalism of Baldwin (1995) comes to 
mind. Here, the danger that additional RTAs are attempting to counter is not the 
loss of economic attractiveness but the dangerous loss of economic dependency 
that it may imply. Hence, RTAs may be contagious for political and not only for 
economic reasons. Finally, our results are consistent with the view that windows of 
opportunity for locking-in peace through trade exist. RTAs are difficult to sign for 
countries with a history of recent conflicts, but country pairs with a long-run history 
of bilateral conflicts have a higher propensity to sign an RTA. Hence, periods of 
peace between old enemies should be exploited to sign an RTA and lock-in a more 
peaceful bilateral relationship.
Appendix A: Theoretical Setup
In the absence of an RTA, the expected welfare of a country is equal to V 
= (1 − δe) U P + δe(1 − W ) U P . Indeed, peace occurs with probability (1 − δe) and, 
in that case, the country trades under MFN tariff with its partner and gets the bench-
mark welfare  U P . War occurs with probability (δe), and, in that case, trade is fully 
disrupted and some destructions happen; the country gets (1 − W ) U P . If an RTA is 
in force, the logic is similar and the expected welfare of the country is equal to  V rta 
= (1 − δ  e rta )(1 + t ) U P + δ  e rta (1 − W ) U P . Plugging those two expressions into 
the RTA formation condition,  V rta − V ≥ C, and rescaling by the benchmark wel-
fare  U P , we easily obtain condition (2) in the main text.
Combining (2) and (3), we obtain
(A1)  (1 − δe)t − δ eW (1 +   t _ W )   e rta − e _e  ≥ c
(A2)  (1 − δe)t + δ eW  ε cost (1 +  t _ W )(  ε pol  _ ε cost   +  t _ W ) ≥ c.
We assume that the RTA-related trade gains are small with respect to the cost of 
wars such that t/W ∼ 0. Hence, we get the following approximation:
(A3)  (1 − δe)t + δe( ε pol W +  ε cost t ) ≥ c,
which corresponds to equation (4) in the main text.
Appendix B: Marginal Effect and Interaction
The coefficient of the interaction term between trade gains and old wars is posi-
tive both in our benchmark LPM specification (column 7, Table 2) and in our bench-
mark logit specification (column 1, Table 4). However, Ai and Norton (2003) show 
that interaction terms have a sign that can be deceptive in a logit framework, and 
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that cannot be interpreted readily. Hereafter, we investigate this question more fully 
by calculating the marginal effect of this interaction term for the whole range of 
benchmark probabilities.
The interaction between old wars and trade gains, but also with multilateral open-
ness, somewhat complicates the computation of the marginal effects with respect to 
Ai and Norton (2003). Let us denote  x 1 ,  x 2 ,  x 3 our three variables of interest and Z 
the vector of covariates. Our logit preferred specification (8) writes as
(A4)  ˆ    ℙ =   1   _____   
1 + exp[− β 1  x 1 −  β 2  x 2 −  β 3  x 3 −  β 12  x 1  x 2 −  β 13  x 1  x 3 − β  Z t ]  ,
where  ˆ  
 
 ℙ is the estimated probability of RTA formation. Simple computations lead to
(A5)    ∂  2 ˆ  
 
 ℙ _ ∂  x 1 ∂  x 2  =  ˆ  
 
 ℙ(1 −  ˆ    ℙ) β 12 +   ˆ    ℙ(1 −  ˆ    ℙ)(1 − 2 ˆ    ℙ)( β 2 +  β 12  x 1 )
 × ( β 1 +  β 12  x 2 +  β 13  x 3 ).
We use this formula to estimate the marginal effect of this interaction term for the 
whole range of benchmark probabilities. Results are shown in Figure A1. Panel A 
reports the marginal effects for the interaction between trade gains and security 
gains, while panel B reports them for the interaction between multilateral openness 
and security gains. In both graphs, each dot corresponds to an observed country pair. 
We see that the marginal effects of the two interaction terms are mostly positive. It 
also confirms that, due to the functional form of the logit probability distribution, 
the reversal of the sign of the marginal effects is more likely when the estimated 
probabilities are located in the neighborhoods of 0 and 1. Since, in our sample, those 
estimated probabilities are quite concentrated at those two extreme values, verifying 
that those marginal effects are indeed positive was important.
Figure A1. The Interaction Terms
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Appendix C: Further Country Pairs in Trade Gains Table
Table A1—Estimated Trade Gains for the 51st–100th country pairs in 1956
Trade gains
Country pair
Min T
(percent) 
Mean T 
(percent)
Bil. open. 
min  
imports
 _
GDP
  
(percent) Dist. kms Ever RTA?
USA COL 0.259 2.262 0.105 4,251 No
FRA ITA 0.256 0.338 0.261 892 Yes
THA IDN 0.256 0.305 0.615 2,306 Yes
GBR DEU 0.256 0.29 0.526 809 Yes
NLD IDN 0.249 0.548 1.363 1,1346 No
CAN VEN 0.248 0.262 0.683 4,647 No
BEL SWE 0.244 0.3 0.941 1,152 Yes
DEU DNK 0.239 0.845 0.425 538 Yes
CZS BGR 0.236 0.72 0.307 1,084 No
GBR ZAF 0.234 1.474 0.481 9,489 Yes
JPN IDN 0.23 0.731 0.329 5,482 No
FRA SWE 0.227 0.262 0.231 1,616 Yes
HUN ROM 0.225 0.235 0.128 540 Yes
SAU IND 0.223 0.3 0.191 3,509 No
DEU AUT 0.222 1.358 0.393 592 Yes
CHN LKA 0.219 0.426 0.095 4,914 No
CHN JPN 0.216 0.3 0.167 1,975 No
FRA CHE 0.214 0.57 0.217 474 Yes
ARG GBR 0.213 0.3 0.438 11,137 No
CZS ROM 0.212 0.456 0.275 902 No
HUN BGR 0.211 0.256 0.278 693 Yes
GBR IRL 0.209 2.164 0.429 425 Yes
BRA SWE 0.209 0.247 0.545 10,185 No
IND PAK 0.208 0.271 0.178 1,238 No
VEN NLD 0.207 0.226 0.571 7,972 No
POL AUT 0.203 0.211 0.227 549 Yes
BGR ROM 0.2 0.257 0.105 370 Yes
BRA URY 0.193 0.568 0.368 2,168 Yes
SDN EGY 0.193 0.644 0.462 1,736 Yes
USA BEL 0.192 0.601 0.078 7,303 No
BRA DNK 0.19 0.191 0.365 9,776 No
ROM EGY 0.19 0.198 0.1 1,792 No
POL HUN 0.19 0.298 0.196 520 Yes
ARG ITA 0.188 0.298 0.281 11,214 No
CHL ARG 0.184 0.338 0.255 1,157 Yes
SYR SAU 0.182 0.278 0.686 1,463 No
BRA FIN 0.179 0.219 0.34 10,749 No
HUN CHN 0.178 0.336 0.077 7,710 No
GBR BEL 0.177 0.417 0.363 448 Yes
IDN AUS 0.175 0.211 0.501 5,078 No
CHE AUT 0.175 0.277 0.587 576 Yes
ARG DEU 0.174 0.473 0.309 11,646 No
BRA ESP 0.174 0.201 0.206 7,821 No
LBN SAU 0.172 0.226 0.648 1,417 No
HND SLV 0.171 0.274 0.519 244 Yes
JPN AUS 0.171 0.404 0.346 7,827 No
SYR JOR 0.169 0.317 0.733 373 No
BRA NOR 0.168 0.169 0.324 10,018 No
AFG PAK 0.168 0.257 0.104 806 No
ITA SWE 0.166 0.194 0.248 1,833 Yes
note: Lines in boldface indicate pairs that sign the Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
a year later.
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